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THE CONCEPT OF MONEY IN THE 4TH 
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION –  
A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
 






This article explores some of the changes that the 4th Industrial Revolution brings 
to our understanding of money. Our analysis does not suggest that the only valid 
form of money is that provided or backed by the state. We rather argue that it is 
unlikely that money-like means of payment will prove sustainable in the long-
term if not perceived as being vested with some form of legality. Still, mere 
legality will not prove to be sufficient for the new payment instruments to qualify 
as money. They must also prove to be able to serve as means of 
exchange/payment. A sharp reduction in value will diminish the credibility of the 
payment promise and thus user confidence/trust. Like acceptance of payment on 
sight, the use of money as a common measure of value is one of the most 
important properties of fiat (and metallic) money. Retention of value in times of 
stress is fundamental as regards the new assets’ ability to act as a measure of 
value and its ability to fit with common perceptions of money. The requisite 
enquiry should be based on empirical studies of the intertemporal behaviour of 
the instrument. We suggest that fiat money aside, instruments that could 
eventually qualify as “money” ought to pass the dual test of legality and relative 
retention of value. This approach does not suggest a return to the metallic rule, 
which would limit free circulation of money. It is rather a pragmatic 
reformulation of the characteristics that means of payment, which do not enjoy 
the backing (will) of the state, must exhibit to enjoy quasi-money or money-like 
status. Assets that display high volatility are, thus, unlikely to fulfil the functions 
of “money” and should instead be dealt under the law of investments if they 
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The origin of money is mired in history and there is no indication that money was invented in 
any one place. It seems that in “many societies, this origin is related to the acceptance of silver 
(or other commodities) as money”1.  Silver was used as a medium of exchange, unit of account 
and store of value since the 3rd millennium BC in Mesopotamia2”. In pure economic terms, the 
use of money was spurred by the fact that it could serve as an easy way to calculate the measure 
of value (unit of account).3 As such, it could speed up exchange and commerce, given that 
barter was ridden with frictions. Thus, money also became the key medium of exchange/means 
of payment, not just for the purchase of goods and services, but also for the 
extinction/repayment of debt obligations. In recent times and for the most part of the post-1945 
era, the term “money” became synonymous with fiat money. The latter is a form of money that 
                                               
An updated version of this paper will appear as the lead article in the March 2020 special issue on 
alternative finance of the Singapore Journal of Legal Studies. Please cite the article and not the paper. 
We are grateful to for excellent comments on an earlier version of this paper to Charles Goodhart and an 
anonymous referee. 
 
*Emilios Avgouleas holds the Chair in International Banking Law and Finance, University of Edinburgh; 
Vis. Research Professor, HKU; Vis. Professor, School of European Political Economy, LUISS. 
 
** Sir William Blair is the Professor of Financial Law and Ethics, Queen Mary University of London, Centre 
for Commercial Law Studies; First President of the Board of Appeal of the European Supervisory 
Authorities (2012-2019); former Judge of London’s Commercial Court, Judge in Charge of the Commercial 
Court from 2016.   
 
1 R.J. van der Spek & Bas van Leeuwen (eds), Money, Currency and Crisis: In Search of Trust, 2000 BC 
to AD 2000 (UK: Routledge Exploration in Economic History, 2018), ch 1. 
 
2 Ibid. For an excellent account of the history of money development see Christine Desan, Making Money: 
Coin, Currency, and the Coming of Capitalism (UK: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
3 See on this point Feng Zhu, “Money and Finance in the Digital Age: Some New Developments”, in Marlene 
Amstad et al., eds, Central Bank Digital Currency and Fintech in Asia (Asian Development Bank Institute, 
2019, e-book) 114 at ch 6, p 126. 
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is not backed by metal, but rather has the approval (charter) of the sovereign state forming the 
express will (fiat) of the state with respect to its choice of token that it uses to collect its taxes.4  
 
Fiat money is widely perceived to perform all three classic functions of money: unit of account, 
store of value, and means of exchange or payment. This does not mean though that all fiat is 
chartal money, since bank deposits are included in the M1, which is the narrowest measure of 
money in circulation.5 Deposits are either the result of bank loans or are used to generate bank 
loans based on the fractional reserve principle which is inextricably linked with so-called 
private money creation.6 
 
Another, less formalistic, approach to money holds that money is premised on trust, which can 
be the essential ingredient for the proper functioning of a society. Under this approach, money 
can be seen as a form of communication akin to a letter, a text message, or a neolithic cave 
painting, albeit it being a communication of a specialised kind. Essentially, this approach 
accentuates another aspect of money: social acceptance.  
 
Recent advancements in computing power, digital transactions, data storage, decentralisation 
of decision-making, and algorithmic processing of big data (together called the 4th Industrial 
Revolution), have added a radically new dimension to our idea of how money is delivered. 
This is especially the case in connection with the class of digital assets (cryptoassets)7 called 
                                               
4 Georg Friedrich Knapp, the key proponent of the Chartalist approach to money, argued that: “Money 
always signifies a Chartal means of payment. Every means of payment we call money. The definition of 
money is therefore a Chartal means of payment”. Georg Friedrich Knapp, Die Staatliche Theorie des Geldes 
[The State Theory of Money], abridged and translated by Lucas & Sanger (London: Macmillan & Company, 
1924) at 38; The leading works on the distinction between the metallic rule and the Chartalist approach to 
money are by distinguished LSE economist Charles Goodhart. Charles A.E Goodhart, Money, Information 
and Uncertainty (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1989); Charles A.E Goodhart, “The Two Concepts of 
Money: Implications for the Analysis of Optimal Currency areas” (1998) 14:3 European Journal of Political 
Economy 407. 
 
5 The M1 includes the most liquid portions of the money supply because it contains currency and assets 
that either are or can be quickly converted to cash. It is composed of physical currency and coin, demand 
deposits, travellers' checks, other checkable deposits, and negotiable order of withdrawal accounts. It does 
not include financial assets, such as savings accounts and bonds. "Near money" such as savings deposits, 
money market securities, mutual funds, and other time deposits are included in the broader M2 indicator 
and “near near money” items such as certificates of deposit (CDs), are included in the M3. 
 
6 See Michael McLeay, Amar Radia & Ryland Thomas, “Money creation in the modern economy”, online: 




7  A summary of the most common characteristics of cryptoassets would define them as: (a) digital 
(intangible) archives, which, (b) can be controlled and transferred by means of cryptographic authentication 
(key), and (c) are “created”, stored,  and transferred through the use of a distributed ledger technology; (d) 
they can be decentralised whereby no central authority is responsible for maintaining the ledger; and (e) they 
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cryptocurrencies. Cryptocurrencies do not constitute an acknowledgment of debt nor do they 
incorporate any promise of payment, nonetheless, they could still be used as a means of 
exchange based on custom and acceptance. But has the new technology changed the legal 
nature of money and its uses, or has it simply repackaged its delivery8?  Technology-based 
assets (tokens) like cryptocurrencies and planned forms of payment like Facebook’s Libra 
claim to possess the same utilities as money. These instruments seem to be weaving a thick 
web of complex challenges. These challenges range from a potential (partial) displacement of 
fiat money in the sphere of payments, especially in international retail payments such as 
remittances, to a predicted future challenge over governments’ right to monetary monopoly. 
Even more fundamentally, the flood of data attached to the new forms of payment naturally 
gives rise to a number of issues as to its protection, misuse and possibility of harm,9 which 
have never been associated with money in the same way before.  
 
A large-scale shift away from cash (or fiat) can also lead to new forms of social and political 
control, since even central bank digital money can be subject to controls that are unknown to 
holders of cash. Other examples of how things can go wrong with these new means of payment 
include financial stability risks that may be attached to any future bank stable-coins or Libra-
like tokens and risks of fraud that raises the need for investor/consumer protection.  
 
This article explores the changes that the 4th Industrial Revolution brings to our understanding 
of money. We focus solely on the new digital means of payment in the broader sense. These 
new means of payment include the emerging classes of bitcoin type of cryptoassets that are 
classified as exchange tokens and planned exchange instruments, such as Libra and bank 
stable-coins. Libra and bank stable-coins share the same technological infrastructure with 
cryptoassets but they are not cryptocurrencies per se.10  
                                               
are subject to  governing rules established by the consensus of participants. The rules are enforced by key 
parts of community/circuit/system called nodes. 
 
8 It has been said that “these new forms of currency are new in relation to the technology on which they are 
based but not so new when one considers their underlying legal-conceptual framework”. Andreas 
Rahmatian, “Electronic Money and Cryptocurrencies (Bitcoin): Suggestions for Definitions” (2019) 34:3 
J.I.B.L.R. 115-121.  And see Andreas Rahmatian, Credit and Creed: A Critical Legal Theory of Money 1st 
ed (London: Routledge, 2019). 
 
9 Lord Hodge, Justice of the Supreme Court, “The Potential and Perils of Financial Technology: Can the 
Law Adapt to Cope?” (First Edinburgh FinTech Law Lecture delivered at the University of Edinburgh, 14 
March 2019). 
 
10 US regulators treat the bulk of these instruments as securities under the Howey test that takes a broad and 
functional rather than formalistic approach to what is an investment. For example, a recent SEC paper notes: 
“The so-called “Howey test” applies to any contract, scheme, or transaction, regardless of whether it has any 
of the characteristics of typical securities. The focus of the Howey analysis is not only on the form and terms 
of the instrument itself … but also on the circumstances surrounding the digital asset and the manner in 
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The transformation that technology brings in the way that money is “packaged” and delivered 
extends also to fiat money which may soon be represented by an electronic token by way of 
so-called central bank digital coins (CDBCs). These are predicted to be “money” recognised 
by statute, and, depending of course on the issuer’s standing and fiscal credibility, a durable 
means of payment. Similarly, the use of technology in the “packaging” and delivery of money-
like instruments could extend to the creation of tokens that might have a role in global 
(wholesale) payments, challenging the grip that the USD has on global payment systems. The 
most characteristic idea in this context is Bank of England Governor Mark Carney’s concept 
of a “synthetic hegemonic currency”,11 though the implementation of this idea would face 
several critical challenges. 
 
Electronic money and the use of digital payment systems for the settlement of transactions is 
long established, although systems like Visa and Alipay use for settlement digital 
representations of fiat. Similarly, the use of non-state money has been tried in past free-banking 
                                               
which it is offered, sold, or resold (which includes secondary market sales)” (notes omitted). See U.S.A, 
Securities and Exchange Commission, “Framework for ‘Investment Contract’ Analysis of Digital Assets”, 
Public Statement of the Strategic Hub for Innovation and Financial Technology (3 April 2019), online: 
<https://www.sec.gov/files/dlt-framework.pdf>, at p 1. This approach is not fully adopted by continental 
regulators where the legal nature of securities is inextricable attached with company law and contractual 
rights that securities incorporate offering governance or financial entitlements to shareholders and bond 
investors, and even less so by UK’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), even though it accepts that there 
are overlaps between investment, exchange (money-like), and utility cryptoassets, and nevertheless 
recognises the existence of three distinct classes. See France, Autorité des Marchés Financiers, “Discussion 
Paper on Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs)”, Discussion Paper (26 October 2017), online: <http://www.amf-
france.org/en_US/Actualites/Communiques-de-presse/AMF/annee-
2017?docId=workspace%3A%2F%2FSpacesStore%2F5097c770-e3f7-40bb-81ce-db2c95e7bdae>; see 
also France, Autorité des Marchés Financiers, “Financial Conduct Authority, “Guidance on Cryptoassets”, 
Consultation Paper CP19/3 (January 2019). 
11 Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England, “The Growing Challenges for Monetary Policy in the 
current International Monetary and Financial System” (Speech delivered at the Jackson Hole Symposium 
2019, 23 August 2019). 
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episodes.12 Hayek (and other libertarians) have also been talking about non-state-controlled 
money since the mid- 1970s.13  
 
Still, it is rather doubtful whether the emerging instruments can really prove durable, namely 
as trusted means of exchange/payment in times of crisis, without those properties being 
respected by law and in law. Aristotle made this point in the 4th century BCE, saying in an oft-
quoted and remarkably prescient passage, “… money has been introduced by convention as a 
kind of substitute for need or demand; and this is why we call it νόμισμα14, because its value 
is derived, not from nature, but from law (νόμος15), and can be altered or abolished at will”.16 
Aristotle was referring to the more recent (to his time) invention of coinage rather than money 
generally and had in mind custom and practice as well as what we would now consider to be 
law.  The French intellectual Bodin went a step further to hold that:17 “the right of coinage, it 
is contained within the law-making power, for only he who can make law can regulate currency” 
and the purpose of that was to preserve: “the value, and the weight of the coinage”.18 Written 
at a time when France was torn apart by religious wars, no doubt Bodin viewed money as a 
unifying element within the state. The advent of fiat money has, however, altered the principles 
proposed by Bodin.  
 
Today, money recognised in law and by law means more or less the following. First, state-
issued fiat money issued as money under the law of the issuing state that is backed by the 
                                               
12 A free banking system does not have a lender of last resort and the supply of banknotes and deposits is 
determined by market forces supported by cash reserves or a commodity (such as gold). There have been 
several free banking episodes in Sweden. Also some identify as free banking the operation of state banks 
in the US until the Civil War. The longest free banking episode, however, marking over 100 years of 
relative stability, was in 18th and 19th century Scotland with three commercial banks enjoying the privilege 
to issue banknotes. See Sheila C. Dow & John Smithin, “Free Banking in Scotland 1695-1845” (1992) 39 
Scottish Journal of Political Economy 374 and Lawrence White, Free Banking in Britain: Theory, 
Experience and Debate, 1800–1845 2nd rev. ed (London: The Institute of Economic Affairs, 1995), online: 
<http://www.iea.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/files/upldbook115pdf.pdf>. 
13 F. A. Hayek, Choice in Currency: A Way to Stop Inflation (London: The Institute of Economic Affairs, 
1976); F. A. Hayek, Denationalisation of Money: The Argument Refined (London: Institute of Economic 
Affairs, 1978). 
 
14 I.e. money. 
 
15 Law or custom. 
 
16 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, translated by F. H. Peters, M. A. 5th ed (London: Kegan 
Paul, Trench, Truebner & Co., 1893) at ch V. 
17 Jean Bodin, Les Six livres de la République (Six Books of the Commonwealth), abridged and translated by 





economic might of that state (with the notable exception of reserve currencies which are 
considered in section 2 below). Second, three possible outcomes arise from the duty of state 
bodies and the courts to protect users from false (fraudulent) representations of value: (a) some 
instruments will be held to be legal means of exchange/payment and thus valid money-like 
instruments whose promise is recognised by law, even if the promise is not state-backed, under 
what could be called “affirmed legality”; (b) some instruments will be held not to be illegal as 
not violating any present provision of the law under what could be called “negative clearance” 
type of legality;19 (c) some instruments will be recognised as evidently illegal in their economic 
function or substance (e.g., fraudulent instruments) and holders cannot be protected in asserting 
their rights to the instrument, even if such rights can otherwise be protected under property 
law. 
 
Fiat money is of course recognised as such by statute (see section 4 below). Our analysis does 
not suggest, however, that the only valid form of money is that provided or backed by the state. 
We rather argue that it is unlikely that money-like means of payment will prove sustainable in 
the long-term if not perceived as being vested with some form of legality, even if such 
instruments are never banned or declared illegal. Naturally any legal analysis will not be static 
as the legal status of the instruments could be changed by legislation in the future. At the same 
time, for the broad mass of users, what matters is the perception of instrument legality, which 
in times of stress may also have some impact on instrument popularity/acceptance. Hence, we 
use the term “perceived” legality. 
 
We further argue that mere legality will not prove to be a sufficient test for these new payment 
instruments to qualify as money. They must also prove to be able to serve as means of 
exchange/payment at all times. This is a very important distinction because most 
cryptocurrencies and other similar assets do not incorporate a debt promise, which for several 
commentators is an inextricable property of money. 20  Thus, unless they exhibit other 
characteristics, such as being a reliable measure of value,21 it would be easier to dismiss their 
claim to being “money”. 
                                               
19 The term “negative clearance” was frequently used in EU Competition Law to indicate that a specific 
commercial practice did not breach EU Antitrust Law. In the case of instruments that are the subject of 
“negative clearance” there is, of course, uncertainty as to whether they may be declared illegal in the future 
or be subjected to a legal and regulatory regime that is much more burdensome than at present. 
 
20 “Money is an obligation or, from a debtor’s perspective, a form of debt”. See Andreas Rahmatian, “Money 
as a Legally Enforceable Debt” (2018) 29:2 European Business Law Review 205 at p 213.  
21 As it has also been noted by a recent ADB report: “Money has a numeric or mathematical reasoning and 
technology will not change this basic function and any means of payment that claims to serve as money 
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The fact that most of the new exchange instruments, planned bank stable-coins aside, do not 
incorporate a debt claim and thus an obligation of repayment, or any other item of intrinsic 
value, makes the valuation of these assets firmly based on acceptance/user popularity. It 
follows that when, for psycho-social (market panics) 22  or other reasons, some of these 
instruments experience reduced levels of usage/acceptance in times of stress, their value will 
diminish due to the way they are built/structured and priced. But a sharp reduction in value 
will, in turn, diminish the credibility of the payment promise and thus user confidence. This 
may be the outcome for the majority of unbacked instruments whose value is a representation 
of market prices or pegs on fiat on the basis of an algorithmic mechanism that regulates token 
circulation23 rather than any actual or sufficient reserves. 
 
This finding means that some of these instruments would not be able to fulfil the functions of 
“money” even if they did qualify as property under the law of certain jurisdictions and at 
common law. Like acceptance of payment on sight, the use of money as a common measure of 
value is one of the most important properties of fiat (and metallic) money. The new instruments 
whose popularity today is either due to irrational exuberance and heightened speculation or 
because they are a manifestation of social (relational) preferences that create positive network 
externalities must also prove their durability. Retention of value in times of stress is 
fundamental as regards the new assets’ ability to act as a measure of value and thus ability to 
fit with common perceptions of money. This is especially true with respect to one of the most 
critical properties of money, namely, the use of money as a record of value/ “memory”.24 The 
requisite test would be based on empirical studies of the intertemporal behaviour of the 
instrument. 
 
                                               
should perform this function at all times.” See Yuksel Gormez, “Central Bank Digital Currency: A 
Historical Perspective”, supra note 3 at p 245. 
 
22 On the impact of irrational herding and panics on market prices, see DS Scharfstein and J Stein, “Herd 
Behavior and Investment” (1990) 80 American Economic Review 465 and David Hirschliefer, “Investor 
Psychology and Asset Pricing” (2001) 56 Journal of Finance 1533. For the downwards impact of herding 
due to panic impacts on stock prices when short sales are allowed see Emilios Avgouleas, “A New 
Framework for the Global Regulation of Short Sales” (2010) 15 Stanford Journal of Law Business & 
Finance 376, at Part II.A.2. 
 
23 For a full explanation of how these mechanisms work, see below section 3.1 and infra note 55. 
 
24 The theory that money might serve as memory, namely as a short-circuited system of recording value, was 
in modern times posited by Narayana Kocherlakota an economist who served as President of the Minneapolis 
Federal Reserve Bank between 2009-2015. See N. Kocherlakota, “Money is Memory” (1996) Federal 
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Research Department Staff Report 218 and N. Kocherlakota, “Money is 
Memory” (1998) 81:2 Journal of Economic Theory 232–251. 
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We have already experienced this situation with cryptocurrencies like “Tether”, which 
eventually burned its insufficient reserves and became untethered.25 The same can happen to 
all similar instruments if the reserves set aside to back the parity prove to be insufficient to 
support redemptions and thus the parity, something that the Primary Fund,26 a well-known 
money market fund, experienced in 2008 when it “broke the buck”. 
 
Thus, we postulate here that instruments that could eventually qualify as “money” ought to 
pass a dual test: legality and relative retention of value at all times. This does not suggest a 
return to the metallic rule, which would limit free circulation. It is rather a pragmatic 
reformulation of the characteristics that private means of payment that do not enjoy the backing 
(will) of the state must exhibit to enjoy quasi-money or money-like status. And while intrinsic 
value may be important, the main reference here is to the market price stability that enables the 
instrument to act as a reliable measure of value. In plain terms, this would mean that assets that 
display high volatility would be unlikely to fulfil the functions of “money”.27Any form of 
currency faces the theoretical risk of extinction, by break-up of the issuing State, or by some 
catastrophic event, or times of universal crisis.  But to count as “money”, new forms of 
instrument must show robustness through the vagaries of economic life, and not be what we 
                                               
25  This is in fact what happened with the controversial cryptocurrency “Tether”. Tether was initially 
pegged to the USD but in 2018, due to “concerns around the validity of Tether’s reserves of fiat currency 
corresponding to the circulating amount of tokens”, dipped below the $1 mark amid a wave of negative 
sentiment. See Gareth Jenkinson, “Untethered: The History of Stablecoin Tether and How It Has Lost Its 
$1 Peg”, CoinTelegraph (17 October 2018), online: <https://cointelegraph.com/news/untethered-the-
history-of-stablecoin-tether-and-how-it-has-lost-its-1-peg>.  Subsequently, Tether Ltd, the issuer of the 
cryptocurrency, announced that buyers of Tethers have no contractual right, other legal claims, or 
guarantee that their tokens will be redeemed or exchanged for dollars, and that Tether is a “fractional 
reserve stable-coin". See Olga Kharif, "Tether Says Stablecoin Is Only Backed 74% by Cash, Securities", 
Bloomberg (30 April 2019), online: <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-30/tether-says-
stablecoin-is-only-backed-74-by-cash-securities>.  
 
26 The $62.6 billion Reserve Primary Fund "broke the buck" in September 2018 when its net asset 
value (NAV) fell to 97 cents per share. It was one of the first times in the history of investing that a 
retail money market fund had failed to maintain a $1 per share NAV which money market funds use as a 
benchmark. See Kimberly Amadeo, “Reserve Primary Fund, How It Broke the Buck Causing a Money 
Market Run”, TheBalance.com (15 November 2018), online: <https://www.thebalance.com/reserve-
primary-fund-3305671>. 
 
27 For example, the IMF notes that “Cryptocurrency is by far the riskier . . . The standard deviation of day-
on-day changes in Bitcoin prices is approximately 10 times higher than in most G7 currency pairs, and even 
a little higher than in the Venezuelan Bolivar to U.S. dollar exchange rate.” See Tobias Adrian & Tommaso 
Mancini Griffoli, “The Rise of Digital Money”, online: (2019) IMF FinTech Notes No. 19/001, online: 
<https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fintech-notes/Issues/2019/07/12/The-Rise-of-Digital-Money-
47097> at p 6. 
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have called elsewhere in this paper “fair weather” money.  Without that, the instruments will 
not be suitable as a means of payment. 
 
It is sometimes claimed that legality does not matter in the crypto-space. It is correct that in a 
globalised world, the laws of individual jurisdiction are less relevant to the day-to-day use and 
storage of digital tokens in electronic wallets, especially if these tokens are held as a form of 
investment or a means to conduct payments within a closed-circuit environment. Still, any 
instrument that leaves the closed community of users or closed-circuit system of payments to 
be used as a means of payment for the purchase of even basic real goods, such as a car or a 
chocolate bar and services, such as house cleaning, or real assets, such as a house, will be 
subject to some form of contractual or regulatory law. Leaving aside statutory and regulatory 
legal restrictions on money laundering, which are jurisdiction specific, some contracts 
performed by means of payment of monetised value contain an explicit or implicit choice of 
law clause (see section 4 below). Similarly, such transactions tend to have other de facto links 
to a given jurisdiction, for example, because the contract or the payment involves a consumer 
in that jurisdiction.  
 
There is also a view that only fiat currencies which enjoy de jure legality (and legitimacy) as 
constituted by law and which enjoy the institutional backing of an independent central bank 
can create the necessary trust. In September 2019, Yves Mensch, a member of the European 
Central Bank (“ECB”) Governing Council, signalling ECB’s concerns with the emerging 
means of payment, especially Facebook’s Libra, stated the following:  
“Private currencies have little or no prospect of establishing themselves as viable 
alternatives to centrally-issued legal tender. Only an independent central bank can give 
money the institutional backing needed to make it reliable and able to win public trust 
. . . I sincerely hope that the people of Europe will not be tempted to leave behind the 
safety and soundness of established payment solutions and channels in favor of the 
beguiling but treacherous promises of Facebook’s siren call.” 
 
This statement may be compared with an IMF note of July 2019 authored by two 
distinguished economists who adopt a much more nuanced position28: 
“Economists beware! Payments are not just the act of extinguishing a debt. They are 
an exchange, an interaction between people—a fundamentally social experience. If 
two people use the same payment method, a third is more likely to join.” 
 
                                               
28 Ibid at p 8. 
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In a way, the gap between the two approaches could not be wider. This article suggests that the 
interplay of perceived legality and market use in times of stress will be of fundamental 
importance in the establishment of new instruments as credible means of payment at all times, 




Several of the new means of payment/instruments that are the subject matter of this article, 
whether they belong to the instrument class that is called crypto-assets or not (e.g., bank stable-
coins or Libra), may still qualify as property and certainly as securities.29 So if they are issued 
under the relevant securities regimes and comply with requisite disclosure requirements, they 
would be vested with (affirmed) legality. While this distinction is not as important as in the 
past when it comes to asset transfers, since the same principles of tokenisation that apply to 
most of these novel means of payment can also apply to the transfer of debt instruments, the 
key test here is not frictionless transfer over a blockchain environment. It is rather market 
willingness to accept an instrument as payment.  
 
In this context, the article critically examines which new forms of payment (in a generic form) 
could fit the existing legal framework - especially in a common law context, as this is the most 
popular choice of legal system in most international commercial transactions - without major 
amendments. Realistically speaking, major amendments are unlikely since governments and 
the courts, even where they take a strong position in fostering innovation, rarely have very 
strong incentives to legitimise forms of payment (or currency) that compete with their own or 
are thought to be susceptible to fraud. This tension is set to intensify once several of the world’s 
biggest central banks make the leap to digitisation by offering their own electronic currency-
like tokens.30 Already US regulators have suggested that apart from fully decentralised tokens 
                                               
29 This is certainly the approach of US regulators for the bulk of these instruments which seem to qualify as 
securities under the Howey test that takes a broad and functional rather than formalistic approach to what is 
an investment. See supra note 10. 
 
30 See William Suberg, “China’s Central Bank to Lead Real-World Pilot of Digital Yuan: Report”, 
CoinTelegraph (9 December 2019), online: <https://cointelegraph.com/news/chinas-central-bank-to-lead-
real-world-pilot-of-digital-yuan-report>. It is reported that China has devoted five years of research and 
system development work to its forthcoming central bank digital currency (CBDC) and proceeded to 
conduct its first real-world pilot of the currency in December 2019. As reported by CoinTelegraph in 
English, reproducing an item from Caijing, China was planning to conduct the first real-world test of its 
central bank digital currency (CBDC) in Shenzhen before the end of 2019 and such tests would possibly 
also include Suzhou. Specifically, under the auspices of the People’s Bank of China (PBoC), four major 
banks and major economic participants such as China Telecom would test digital currency 
payments. Caijing reported that in Shenzhen, the PBoC was encouraging a “horse race”, with each bank 
managing the digital currency differently, competing against each other in order to secure its model’s 
wider adoption in the future. See The People’s Bank of China, Media Release, “2020年中国人民银行工
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such as Bitcoin and Ethereum, the rest are subject to the statutory framework governing 
security investments.31  
 
The article is in five sections, including this introduction. Section 2 explains the evolution of 
fiat money as the key form of money and issues relating to its function as a store of value. 
Section 3 examines the key functions of some of the emerging means of payment. Section 4 
examines the legal framework governing money using the English and other common law 
systems as reference. Section 5 provides the conclusions.  
 
2. Fiat Money as store of value 
2.1. Introductory 
In the context of money and payments, one of the fundamental questions of our times is whether 
the new means of payment will be able to mount a credible challenge to fiat money. In the view 
of the authors, the answer to this question will not hinge on which theory of money will prevail 
but rather on which form of “money” will retain user confidence/trust at all times. Provided 
that the new instruments enjoy legal recognition, the answer to the question is inextricably 
linked with the retention by each type of “money” of its value as a means of exchange/means 
of payment and thus a valid record of value. As this approach is not linked to any notion of 
intrinsic value, fiat money should not be excluded from this analysis. On the contrary, in a 
world where new means of payment claim to have the ability to displace fiat money, a 
discussion about user trust in fiat and especially in its ability to constitute a credible record at 
all times, has a central place in the analysis. In the following paragraphs, we briefly discuss the 
evolution of fiat and the conditions that make fiat money a credible measure means of 
exchange/measure of value. 
 
                                               
作会议在京召开” (The Conference of the People’s Bank of China 2020 held in Beijing) (05 January 
2020), online: PBoC < http://www.pbc.gov.cn/goutongjiaoliu/113456/113469/3955023/index.html> 
[translated by author]. On 5 January 2020 the PBoC made a brief statement on its progress with the digital 
yuan stating that: “The research on digital fiat currency proceeded smoothly.” 
 
31 “[A] digital asset transaction may no longer represent a security offering [if] the network on which the 
token or coin is to function is sufficiently decentralized . . .  [a]s a network becomes truly decentralized, 
the ability to identify an issuer or promoter to make the requisite disclosures becomes difficult, and less 
meaningful . . . when I look at Bitcoin today, I do not see a central third party whose efforts are a key 
determining factor in the enterprise . . . applying the disclosure regime  . . . to the offer and resale of 
Bitcoin would seem to add little value. And . . . based on my understanding of the present state of Ether, 
the Ethereum network and its decentralized structure, current offers and sales of Ether are not securities 
transactions . . .” Remarks by William Hinman, SEC Director, Corporate Finance Division, “Digital Asset 
Transactions: When Howey Met Gary (Plastic)” (Speech at the Yahoo Finance Summit delivered at San 




2.2 The Nature of fiat Money 
Fiat money is understood here to mean central bank or government money that is not backed 
by any metal or other commodity and is circulating in the economy through the banking system 
and by means of the performance of state functions like collection of taxes and public spending. 
Government backed paper money and banknotes have been in circulation for a long time: in 
the case of China, use can be traced to the 12th and 13th centuries,32 and to the 17th33 and 18th in 
case of the West, but this can primarily be seen as a development of the post-war period 
culminating in the 1971 decision of the United States to suspend the dollar’s convertibility into 
gold. 
 
Freely transferrable instruments that incorporated debt claims such as promissory notes or 
banknotes and banker’s drafts were in wider circulation and were used to conduct payments 
without the transfer of coins since at least the Italian renaissance. Yet, nobody equated them 
with private creation of government (fiat) money. Bagehot wrote Lombard Street to explain 
the role of the banking system in creating liquidity for the economy and the duty of the central 
bank in supporting that function as the lender of last resort.34  But he did not equate the 
discounted commercial paper that he accurately held to be a major source of funding for the 
British economy at the time with private money.  
 
Moreover, the two known examples of major governments parting with metal (either the Gold 
Standard35 or a bimetallic rule) were, first, the US government recognising paper money as 
                                               
32 See William N. Goetzmann & Elisabeth Köll, “Paying in Paper – a Government Voucher from the 
Southern Song”, in Goetzmann & K. Geert Rouwenhorst, eds, The Origins of Value: The Financial 
Innovations that Created Modern Capital Markets (London: Oxford University Press, 2005), ch 5, esp. p 
101-102. 
 
33 The florin, a fiat money, was managed by an early form of central bank, the Bank of Amsterdam. 
Stephen Quinn & William Roberds, “Death of a Reserve Currency” (2016) 12:4 International Journal of 
Central Banking 63. 
 
34 Walter Bagehot, Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market (London: Hyperion Press, 1873). 
 
 
35 “The gold standard broke down during World War I, as major belligerents resorted to inflationary finance, 
and was briefly reinstated from 1925 to 1931 as the Gold Exchange Standard. Under this standard, countries 
could hold gold or dollars or pounds as reserves, except for the United States and the United Kingdom, which 
held reserves only in gold. This version broke down in 1931 following Britain’s departure from gold in the 
face of massive gold and capital outflows . . . Between 1946 and 1971, countries operated under the Bretton 
Woods system . . . [a] modification of the gold standard, most countries settled their international balances 
in U.S. dollars, but the U.S. government promised to redeem other central banks’ holdings of dollars for 
gold at a fixed rate of thirty-five dollars per ounce. Persistent U.S. balance-of-payments deficits steadily 
reduced U.S. gold reserves . . . [O]n August 15, 1971, President Richard M. Nixon announced that the United 
States would no longer redeem currency for gold.” See Michael Bordo, “The Gold Standard”, online: The 
Library of Economics and Liberty, <https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/GoldStandard.html>. 
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legal tender alongside silver coins during the US civil war36 and during the Great War in Great 
Britain due to government needs to fund the war effort. They were both short-lived episodes 
and after their conclusion, UK and US governments returned to the Gold standard.37 In the 
post-1945 period, the gold standard was partly replaced by the fixed exchange rates regime of 
Bretton Woods.38  
  
It is, therefore, right to say that fiat money acquired its present prominence after the abolition 
of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rates in 1971. Any criticism simply centred around the 
issue of inflation that affects the use of money as store of value, and that was tamed by the 
central banks - starting first with the late Paul Volcker’s Federal Reserve raising interest rates 
without any regard to the attendant political costs and subsequently through the 1990s Jackson 
Hole consensus on the value of price stability, the so-called Great Moderation.39 The latter has 
also underpinned central bank independence for the past 25 years.  
 
The monetary hegemony of the USD in the era after the second world war40 was followed by 
a continuous widening of the US deficit and thus issuance of new US government debt. This 
was coupled by the rapid advancement of capital markets and financial innovation within the 
USA that has led to the creation of an economy that was funded largely independently of bank 
lending through very deep and open capital markets. As a result, the overseas holdings of USD 
mostly held by energy exporters to the USA in the 1970s, which were much recycled through 
the (offshore) international lending markets in USD (so called euro-markets), were followed 
by massive overseas holdings of both US government and private USD denominated assets.41 
                                               
36 See Legal Tender Act, c 33, 12 Stat 345 (1862). 
 
37 “The gold standard was a commitment by participating countries to fix the prices of their domestic 
currencies in terms of a specified amount of gold. National money and other forms of money (bank deposits 
and notes) were freely converted into gold at the fixed price . . . The period from 1880 to 1914 is known as 
the classical gold standard.” Bordo, supra note 35. 
 
38 See, inter alia, B. Eichengreen & Mark Flandreau “Introduction”, in Eichengreen, Flandreau eds, The 
Gold Standard in Theory and History 2nd ed. (New York: Rutledge, 1997) at p 1-21. 
 
39 For an overview of the principles of the “Great Moderation” and the (partial) impact on it of monetary 
policy, see Ben S. Bernanke, US Federal Reserve Governor, “The Great Moderation” (Remarks at the 
meetings of the Eastern Economic Association, delivered at Washington, DC, 20 February 2004), online: 
The Federal Reserve Board, 
<https://www.federalreserve.gov/BOARDDOCS/SPEECHES/2004/20040220/default.htm>. 
 
40 The US monetary hegemony has led the former governor of the Bank of England, Mark Carney, to endorse 
the view that the global financial cycle is the dollar cycle. Carney, supra note 11, p 7. See also Helene Rey, 
"Dilemma Not Trilemma: The Global Cycle and Monetary Policy Independence" (2013) The National 
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 21162, online: < http://www.nber.org/papers/w21162>. 
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With the nearly global abolition of capital controls during the 1980s and the 1990s, the US 
economy became the principal destination of overseas investment and in turn, overseas private 
and state actors became major holders of US assets. With the expansion (explosion) of global 
financial markets and especially derivatives markets in the 1990s onwards, the USD graduated 
from being the predominant currency of international trade and thus government borrowing (to 
pay for imports) to being the currency in which the most liquid international financial assets 
are denominated. These assets are used today for the settlement of transactions in global 
financial markets, further reinforcing the grip of the USD.  
 
In order to complete their economic and political integration, but also spurred by the US global 
monetary hegemony, the continental members of the rising EU created their own common 
currency, the Euro, in the 1990s, which was, however, based on an incomplete architecture. 
Furthermore, China, as the rising economic power of the 21st century has also tried to 
internationalise its currency the RMB, although the effort has been hampered by trade 
surpluses, capital controls, access restrictions for foreign investors, and relatively shallow bond 
markets.    
 
But this ominous and unabated battle of currencies has now been overshadowed, to some 
extent, by three important developments that today inform all discussions about a forthcoming 
challenge to the dominance of fiat money and of the USD.  The first development was the near 
collapse of the western financial system during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), which has 
raised questions about the banks’ privilege to create money through fractional reserve lending, 
prompting some commentators to call for the introduction of full reserve banking.42 Others 
asked for a return to the Gold standard or for subtle forms of controlling money circulation 
through the banking system.43  
 
The second development has been the fact that the prolonged use of quantitative easing (QE) 
programmes and the retention of very low to negative interest rates by the ECB, the US Federal 
Reserve and the central banks of other developed economies such as Japan, has caused a 
                                               
41 See, inter alia, Thomas Costigan, Drew Cottle & Angela Keys “The US Dollar as the Global Reserve 
Currency: Implications for US Hegemony” (2017) 8 World Review of Political Economy 104; For the 
historical development of the USD’s hegemony and a yet unfulfilled prediction that the USD’s dominance 
in the global economy will decline see Barry Eichengreen, Exorbitant Privilege: The Rise and Fall of the 
Dollar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
 
42 Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Jimmy Stewart Is Dead: Ending the World's Ongoing Financial Plague with 
Limited Purpose Banking (USA: John Willey & Sons, 2010). 
 
43 On the latter, see Morgan Ricks, Money Problem: Rethinking Financial Regulation  (USA: Chicago 
University Press, 2016), Ch. 9. 
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softening of exchange (FX) rates to the point that they were dubbed by developing countries 
as currency manipulation, leading to accusations about the revival of “beggar thy neighbour 
policies”. Extra-ordinary monetary policies have heightened doubts as to whether governments 
could hold the value of fiat money stable, enabling it to serve as a store of value. They have 
also stroked simmering discontent with the USD’s global dominance, giving fresh energy to 
the de-dollarisation debate. So far, the predominance of the dollar has not been challenged, 
despite of the call by Mark Carney for the creation of a synthetic hegemonic currency to be 
used as a new reserve asset.44 Yet, the publicly announced plans of the People’s Bank of China 
to fully digitalise the RMB may be a game-changer in this context. 
 
The third and equally critical development relates to breakthroughs to the use of contemporary 
computing technology, mostly the strand of Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) called 
blockchain, that can be used to create means of payment (and to some extent investment) that 
are neither fiat money nor e-money (i.e., digital representations of fiat money) such as credit 
card, PayPal and Alipay payments. These new payment instruments may be premised on 
social/relational concepts of trust and value with no further anchoring to real economy assets, 
beyond the laws of supply and demand.  
 
 
2.3 Fiat money as store of value  
Central banks hold that fiat is a store of value because it is backed by the economic might of 
the state. This, first, relates to the ability of the state to “back” the currency through payment 
of taxes.45 We have also explained that the measure of strong money backing should also relate 
to price stability. Financial stability, namely the preservation of the ability of a country’s 
banking system to perform its economic role, should be taken to also play a role. Other 
indicators include a country’s taxable wealth and income, productivity rates and infrastructure 
investment or public spending to improve the lives of the less well-off.46  On the other hand, 
budget deficits and, to some extent trade deficits, which invariably indicate loss of 
competitiveness, could mean an erosion of the value of state backing of fiat.  
 
                                               
44 In an oft-reported speech at Jackson Hole in late August 2019 Mark Carney highlighted the perils for the 
stability of the global economy flowing from the hegemony of the USD and offered a blueprint for a new 
global currency. Carney’s proposal combines elements of the new technology and especially of tokens like 
Libra and the principles on which the IMF’s SDRs were built. See Carney, supra note 11. 
 
45 An excellent analysis of this point can be found in Goodhart, Money, Information and Uncertainty, 
supra note 4 at p 36. 
 
46 Especially well-functioning and well-funded education and public health and health insurance systems 
are regarded as major productivity boosts for any economy.  
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There are, however, a number of currencies, the predominant of which is the USD, whose value 
is not directly linked to the fundamentals of the national economy, the so-called reserve 
currencies. These are predominantly the currencies used in international payments, but they 
may also act as a store of value, “safe asset”, in the event of a crisis. The USD, especially, has 
enjoyed an “exorbitant” privilege because of its central position in post-war international 
payments.47   
The “Mercury approach/hypothesis” emphasises the importance of currency safety, liquidity, 
network effects, trade links, and financial connections in determining a currency’s role as 
reserve currency. The hypothesis explains why some currencies are used disproportionately as 
a medium of exchange, store of value, and unit of account by governments and private entities 
engaged in international trade and cross-border financial transactions.48  
 
The “Mars approach/hypothesis” is mainly applied to the choice of reserve currency or 
currencies. It emphasizes strategic, diplomatic, and military power (together defined here as 
geopolitical power). If a country has such geopolitical power, foreign governments will see it 
to be in their national interest to conduct their cross-border transactions using its currency.49 
The leading power for its part will possess political leverage with which to encourage the 
practice. This hypothesis helps to explain some otherwise perplexing aspects of the currency 
composition of international reserves.		
 
These findings mean that fiat money which does not represent a reserve currency retains value 
only when the fundamentals of a given national economy are sound, including inflation. A 
weak economy that runs trade deficits (when exports exceed imports) can debase the role of its 
currency as a store of value through competitive devaluations to boost exports. The practice of 
competitive devaluation (so-called “beggar thy neighbour”) has a negative impact on the role 
of state money as a store of value and was widely followed in the inter-war years. “Beggar thy 
neighbour” devaluations are still observed during episodes of economic turbulence.50  
                                               
 
47 See also B. Eichengreen, A. Mehl & L. Chiţu, How Global Currencies Work: Past, Present, and Future 
(Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017).  
 
48 See M. Chinn & J. Frankel, “Why the Euro Will Rival the Dollar,” (2008) 11 International Finance 49–
73. 
 
49 See, inter alia, B. Cohen, The Geography of Money (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); B. 
Cohen, Currency Power: Understanding Monetary (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015); S. 
Liao & D. McDowell, “No Reservations: International Order and Demand for the Renminbi as a Reserve 
Currency,” (2016) 60 International Studies Quarterly 272–293. 
 
50 E.g., the present and past US administrations often make this claim against their main trade partners and 
chiefly the PRC and the Eurozone economies.  
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Debasing the value of local fiat money may also happen through an expansion of the monetary 
base by means of direct central bank purchases of public (and in some cases, private debt) 
which affects the value of the national currency and thus of exchange rates while boosting the 
value of foreign currency.51  It was under these conditions that the term “currency wars” 
resurfaced in 2010, for the first time since the era of the Great Depression, gaining particular 
prominence when the Brazilian Finance Minister Guido Mantega used it to characterize the 
impact of US monetary policies on the trading parity of the US dollar.52  
 
Thus, emerging means of payment, whether anchored in actual holdings of major reserve 
currency and short-term government securities (e.g., Libra), or linked to certifiable commodity 
reserves (e.g., a petro-coin), may compete with weak local fiat for day-to-day payments. But 
whether or not the token is used outside the black market will also depend on perceived legality. 
It follows that payment instruments that combine legality and retention of value at all times 
could prove to be a sustainable competitor to fiat money. 
3. Emerging Means of Payment: Nature and Taxonomy Update 
3.1 The Nature of New Means of Payment 
 
An influential IMF paper has classified contemporary means of payment as being five-
fold53: (a) central bank money; (b) crypto-currency; (c) b-money, which currently is issued by 
banks; (d) electronic money, or e-money, offered by new private sector providers; and  
(e) i-money, short for investment money, issued by private investment funds.  It has also 
categorised the new means of payment into three distinct categories according to their 
mechanics and economic function avoiding any legal classifications. It has thus divided them 
in: (a) Unmanaged (or decentralised) cryptocurrencies (bitcoin, etc.), also called “public 
coins”; (b) Stable-coins which incorporate a mechanism that maintains the coin’s parity with a 
reference value, which could be the USD or a basket of currencies; and (c) "Managed" coins 
(stable-coins). 
 
                                               
 
51  See C. Fred Bergsten & J. Gannon, “Currency Manipulation, the US Economy, and the Global 
Economic Order” (2012) Peterson Institute Policy Brief 12–25, online: PIIE, 
<https://www.piie.com/sites/default/files/publications/pb/pb12-25.pdf>.  
 
52 See Jonathan Wheatley & Peter Garnham, “Brazil in ‘currency war’ alert” Financial Times (28 
September 2010). 
 
53 Adrian & Griffoli, supra note 27 at p 3. 
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The only bank that has so far used blockchain technology to issue stable-coins has been JP 
Morgan and that is also only within a limited circle of clients. JPM coin is not a cryptocurrency 
– as it cannot be mined outside the bank.54 It is a permissioned payment token with a parity 
with fiat: in principle 1prSTC=1USD. Large banks can back the par with their balance sheet, 
but not infinitely, as their reserves are not unlimited. Moreover, the nature of stable-coins is 
bound to become a matter of controversy if they become anything more than a token for the 
settlement of internal transactions and payments within the bank and between the bank and its 
clients. Potential risks are also very substantial. Possibly for this reason, no bank stable-coin 
have been placed into wider circulation so far.   
 
The first risk is legal. A bank stable-coin is prima facie a debt contract and may be one of two 
things: a mini-bond or a deposit, even if there is no provision for payment of interest. If it is 
the former, the issuing bank needs to publish a prospectus and follow all the disclosure and 
other investor protection safeguards prescribed by securities regulation in the country of the 
buyer of the stable-coin. On the other hand, if it is a deposit-like instrument, then its legality 
will be linked to the willingness of the home country’s deposit guarantee scheme to offer 
cover/protection to stable-coin buyers up the national limit for insured deposits. A third route, 
treating stable-coins as stakes in money market funds, will much depend on the kind of licence 
that the bank issuing the instrument holds. A money market fund stake would also present an 
instant differentiation from demand deposits as money market funds can gate redemptions at a 
time of high demand for repayments.  
 
Another issue of equal importance for the viability of possible future bank stable-coins is 
whether the central bank acting as a lender of last resort would be willing to support this 
activity. Even in the event that stable-coins in USD or any other currency are issued against 
the receipt of fiat in the pegged currency, bank reserves have never been sufficient to cover all 
bank creditor claims in the event of a run. If the central bank does not offer such backing, a not 
unlikely scenario, then the 1prSTC=1USD parity may not prove to be unbreakable. Since the 
instrument will be based on a private contract and not a sovereign central bank’s issuing power, 
the parties’ rights will depend on the governing contractual arrangements. 
 
                                               
54 Strictly speaking, bank stable-coins would not qualify as certificates of deposit unless they bear some 
interest and they are transferable/negotiable between users outside the issuing bank’s network.  
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The third class of so-called “managed” coins55 also raises a host of questions. First, 
“managed” tokens that have the characteristics of cryptocurrencies, the parity being managed 
partly through reserves in the currencies covered and partly through ingenious stabilisation 
mechanisms to retain value/market price in good times, are vulnerable to runs. The ingenious 
part of the parity stabilisation formula is normally based on the stable expansion or 
contraction of the tokens’ circulation (quantity) – namely the algorithmic formula tells the 
system when to mint or burn tokens on the basis of certain circulation thresholds. However, 
these tokens will fail to maintain any utility as store or measure of value (and thus as a means 
of exchange) in the event of massive redemptions. Furthermore, it is certain that these 
anxieties will be heightened if the function of the tokens has largely been based on doubtful 
approaches as regards their legality and regulatory compliance. 
 
Some of these concerns could also apply to Libra-type instruments, although the latter plans 
to support the peg through a full reserve system.56  Libra is neither a cryptocurrency nor fiat. 
Its value does not rise and fall purely on the basis of whatever value investors choose to give 
it. Rather, its sponsors maintain that it will be backed according to a specific ratio by five 
major fiat currencies (U.S. dollars, euros, yen, sterling, and Swiss francs). The user can pay 
for or redeem Libra in those currencies or whichever other currency he or she chooses, be it 
Mexican pesos or South Korean won (as long as that currency is fully convertible). But the 
value of Libra will always be determined by the weighted value of the aforementioned five 
currencies. In principle the reserves will be invested in interest-bearing notes, certificates of 
deposit and bills of exchange, with the Libra Association retaining interest in lieu of payment 
of fees, since the tokens will not pay any interest to the holders.  
 
The Libra Association intends for the total value of outstanding Libra to always be equal to 
the total (market) value of currencies it would hold in reserve.57 That value will be enforced 
                                               
55 The IMF notes about these “managed” instruments: “the algorithm underlying the creation of 
cryptocurrency attempts to stabilize its value relative to fiat currency by issuing more currency when its 
price is high and withdrawing currency from circulation when its price is low. We refer to these systems as 
“managed coins” (some also call these “algorithmically stabilized value coins”)” See Adrian and Griffoli, 
The Rise of Digital Money, supra note 27, at p. 4. The IMF adds: “Managed coins exhibit lower price 
volatility by design. However, these use some variation of a simple system to stabilize value, which is not 
always credible. Issuers purchase coins when their value is low using another asset, and they sell coins 
when their value is high . . . managed coins resemble managed exchange rates [t]heir outstanding stock is 
supposed to keep the exchange rate with fiat currency within tight bands. However, we know too well the 
common fate of pegs . . . Providers of managed coins can also run out of assets to support the price of their 
coins, especially because they may stand on shaky fundamentals—use determining value, and value 
encouraging use.” See Adrian & Griffoli, supra note 27 at p 6. 
 




by the ability of holders to redeem their Libra at any time. This would automatically reduce 
both the amount of fiat held in reserve and the amount of Libra tokens in circulation. Thus, 
the system would, in principle, remain viable on the basis of money in-and money out.  
 
But this principle would also give the Libra Association flexibility not to operate a full 
reserve system, especially if Libra proves a strong store of value by ending up in the day-to-
day use for the purchase of real goods and assets, making redemptions unnecessary. In this 
case, would the Libra Association feel constrained not to invest the reserves into more 
lucrative but also more volatile, or sometimes even less liquid, securities market instruments? 
This approach would spell trouble if Libra is ever faced with a wave of redemptions, which 
central banks with an issuing privilege never face.  In such a scenario, Libra would either 
have to sell reserves at discount, creating market turbulence, or find a way to cover any 
excess redemption calls through the support of a central bank, turning Libra into the latest 
too-big-to-fail institution. 
 
To avoid this scenario, licensing regulators could require the Libra Association to adopt 
robust reserve management and monitoring requirements and issue any essential license to 
operate as a money changer. Alternatively, since reputation would be very important in this 
context, the Libra Association may consider, even if with some reluctance due to current low 
yields, to invest its reserves only in ultra-liquid (and low-yielding) government T-bills, 
lowering the risk of illiquidity in the event of a run, however unlikely that may prove to be.58 
 
The question of Libra’s legal character faces the challenge of a lack of precedent. 
Nonetheless, as discussed in section 4 below, the common law is rather flexible in its 
approach to “money”. Therefore, this problem is more in relation to hostility by central banks 
across the globe. The reason for this hostility is that Libra-type currencies may compete head-
to-head with local fiat money as a means of payment with the extra liquidity, possibly having 
an impact on domestic price-levels. If domestic monetary authorities find themselves unable 
to control the (inflationary) price impact by raising interest rates, they will thus experience 
some loss of monetary sovereignty added to the loss of monitoring and handling of domestic 
                                               
57 Ibid. 
 
58 In any case, currently the Libra White Paper states that its reserves will comprise: “[A] collection of low-
volatility assets, such as bank deposits and short-term government securities in currencies from stable and 
reputable central banks” Ibid. For a comprehensive discussion of the consequences of Libra trading when it 
goes live, see Dirk Zetzsche, Ross Buckley & Douglas Arner, “Regulating LIBRA: The Transformative 
Potential of Facebook’s Cryptocurrency and Possible Regulatory Responses” (2019) University of New 
South Wales Law Research Series UNSWLRS 19-47.  
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payments. The latter can be a valuable source of information about different aspects of the 
economy as well as information that may be of value to law enforcement authorities.   
 
In addition, Facebook’s record in handling customer privacy has justly heightened the 
political antagonism against Libra tokens. In the same context, the possibility of other major 
technology companies such as Google to enter the space and offer users payment and other 
financial services may no longer be discounted, giving rise to major concerns about 
governance and user protection.  
 
Questions about legality would not be in themselves major given the obstacles enumerated 
above if the nature of the product/contract was easy to define, but this is not the case. Legal 
characterisation will vary on a jurisdiction by jurisdiction basis and several legal and 
regulatory formulations may be applicable at the same time. For example, assuming that the 
Libra Association is not licensed as a bank, the instrument may not be characterised as a 
deposit since in most jurisdictions, deposit taking is restricted to specially licensed credit 
institutions. 
 
On the other hand, Mark Carney’s concept of a “synthetic hegemonic 
currency . . . provided . . . perhaps through a network of central bank digital currencies” to 
“dampen the domineering influence of the US dollar on global trade”59 is not to use it as a mere 
unit of account, as was the ECU in the 1980s and 1990s, or a tradeable index,60 but rather as a 
reserve asset. However, a reserve asset in an electronic form would likely be used in 
international payments even if that was not the original design, because it could make 
international payments cheaper and smoother. If such a token were to be used in international 
payments, it would pose a strong competitor to local fiat, due to design stability and presumed 
backing by major central banks. But the difficulties of building such a token are significant. 
There is no clarity as to which countries would back such an initiative, what the share of each 
constituent currency/participant central bank would be, nor who would be the issuer and 
manager of the currency reaping also the benefits of seigniorage.  Nonetheless, this counts as 
a major conceptual contribution to the subject under discussion. 
 
                                               
59 Carney, supra note 11 at p 15. 
 
60 For the latter, see Emilios Avgouleas, “The Incomplete Financial Order and Spillovers from Instability 
in Trade and Currency Regimes” in Avgouleas & David Donald eds, The Political Economy of Financial 
Regulation (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2019), ch 10. 
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Another development involving central bank currencies is presently more important. While 
central bank digital money is not a new means of payment but a new mode to deliver fiat,61 it 
could still present a paradigm shift in several ways. First, it will be the first time that the transfer 
for cash-equivalent of fiat would be subject to continuous government monitoring,62 raising 
the surveillance of citizen behaviour, e.g., spending habits, consumer preferences, and so forth, 
to intolerable levels. Second, if citizens have the ability to keep their savings in an electronic 
wallet that is directly connected with a payments system operated by the central bank, they 
would have no need to keep on demand (very low interest bearing) deposits with commercial 
banks.63 This move could inflict a major blow to the viability of the checking business of 
commercial banks, both undermining their profitability and lending capacity and, ultimately, 
the viability of their present business models. Third, if the issuing central bank does not subject 
the tokens to any export restrictions and other forms of exchange controls, which in this case 
would be in the form of blocking access to the tokens (money) in the account, their portability 
and capacity to be carried in tiny electronic wallets would mean that where the foreign token 
is the expression of a more credible currency than local fiat, there is a strong possibility that it 
would displace local fiat in consumer and other payments.    
                                               
61 As already mentioned, the only known plan for a CBDC which could be put in circulation in the near 
future is that of the PBOC. However, Singapore, Canada and Switzerland have also done advanced trials. 
See Yuan Yang & Hudson Lockett, “What is China’s digital currency plan” Financial Times (25 
November 2019), online: <https://www.ft.com/content/e3f9c3c2-0aaf-11ea-bb52-
34c8d9dc6d84>. 
62 See Paul Pichler, Martin Summer & Beat Weber, “Digital Money” (2018) Q3/18 Monetary Policy and 
the Economy, Oesterreichische National Bank (Austrian Central Bank) 23. 
63 This is certainly one of the features of the Chinese plan. Based on an August report of a PBoC senior 
officer this is what we know for the PBOC plan: First, it would “provide for a “two-tier system” for 
issuance and redemptions. On the first layer, the PBoC would issue and redeem China’s CBDC 
via commercial banks. On the second layer, commercial banks would be responsible for re-distributing 
China’s CBDC to retail market participants.”  On this second layer, the use of blockchain remains 
undecided with blockchain referred to “as an option”. Furthermore, it seems China’s CBDC would adopt 
a "loosely-coupled" design, which would allow fund transfers without the need for a bank account. The 
PBoC views the adoption of the two-tier system as the way to achieve its goal of replacing paper 
money without subverting the existing monetary issuance and circulation system. There would be a 1:1 
pegging mechanism of the digital currency, and its interest-bearing characteristics. By putatively replacing 
China’s M0 money supply with its CBDC, the PBOC would anticipate improvements in the portability of 
retail payments, in Interbank clearing, where a distributed inter-bank ledger system would make clearing 
more efficient, and in Cross-border payments, where the CBDC would enable increased speed and lower 
costs for cross-border payment, ultimately promoting the internationalization of the renminbi. See Mu 
Changchun (Deputy Director of PBoC’s Payment and Settlement Department), “央行数字货币呼之欲出
，设计理念和技术架构首次曝光” (The Practice of Central Bank Legal Digital Currency) ChainNews  
(12 August 2019), online: ChainNews <https://www.chainnews.com/articles/761536251153.htm>. For a 
summary of the report in Chinese and of other description of the PBoC plan, see Jinze & Etienne “First 





3.2 A Critical Assessment of the Perceived Advantages of New Means of Payment  
 
IMF analysis suggests that the new digital means of payment present six complementary 
properties that could make them at least as popular as conventional fiat.64  These are: (a) 
Convenience, (b) Ubiquity, (c) Complementarity, (d) Transaction costs, (e) Trust, and (f) 
Network effects. As regards convenience, the IMF paper rightly suggests that e-money is better 
integrated into our digital lives relative to bank money or central bank money. As suggested in 
our earlier essay on digital money, alongside safety of transactions, this is an element of great 
importance since access to money and its use is as simple as the use of a smartphone.65  Thus, 
in certain countries where access to bank cash is fraught with danger and its transport unsafe, 
doubtless digital means of payment enjoys an advantage over cash. It is, however, unclear why 
cryptocurrencies or other forms of payment are as convenient in their use as digital 
representations of fiat, such as AliPay in China or M-Pesa in Kenya. They probably are not.  
 
As regards Ubiquity, the fact that cross-border transfers of digital money may be faster and 
cheaper than cash and bank deposits is a manifestation of market failure rather than a structural 
advantage. Providers’ failure to adjust downwards the costs of cross-border transfers in the 
digital era is offering a great disservice to their customers. The same applies to the elimination 
of transaction costs, since “transfers in e-money are nearly costless and immediate”, making 
them more attractive than card payments or bank-to-bank transfers across borders. Again, this 
is a failure of the highly oligopolistic global payments industry to adapt to the demands of the 
digital era for instant transfers of funds and settlements of transactions rather than an 
intrinsic/structural advantage of the new means of payment.  
 
A similar observation applies to the point about Complementarity. While it may be true, as the 
IMF suggests, that payments for/settlements of transactions involving assets like stocks and 
bonds would become seamless and automated if these were moved to blockchains eliminating 
manual back-office tasks, this does not merely hold for new means of payments, especially 
cryptocurrencies. The same could be the function of digital representations of fiat, especially 
central bank digital currencies, perhaps moving on blockchain in the specific context.  
 
                                               
64 Adrian & Griffoli, supra note 27 at p 8. 
 
65 William Blair & Emilios Avgouleas, “Opinion: A New Era of Global Payments Is Coming”, Caixin (28 
August 2019).   
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Again, while Network effects66 - better called positive network externalities, which means 
that “[i]f two people use the same payment method, a third is more likely to join” - rightly 
gives full value to the relational/sociological approach to “money”, it does not connote any 
structural competitive advantage for some of the new means of payment, which are ridden 
with frictions and are much less scalable than fiat. It is conceivable that big super market 
chains or big Internet retailers could one day develop their own tokens/means of payment that 
would be exchanged for value, hence building a massive payments network, given their size, 
consumer base, huge supplier chains and scale of sales. Social network platforms are equally 
likely to leverage on their user base to get a chunk of global payments, such as Facebook’s 
attempt via Libra.  
It remains unclear, however, how long it might take for hard to scale cryptocurrencies that 
lack any backing to build networks that can rival today’s biggest payments systems. In 
addition, if such large payment networks are built one day, would they be as fast and reliable 
as legacy systems? This is going to be even more the case if major central banks digitise their 
(reserve) currencies and allow them to be put in global circulation via the use of digital 
wallets. There is no clear explanation as to why the bulk of unsophisticated consumers, at 
least those with no distinct libertarian ideology, would opt to transact in un-backed 
cryptocurrencies or super-market money (if it is ever issued) instead of foreign digitised 
money?  
 
Of the IMF’s six fundamental properties of new means of payment, the last one, Trust, is in 
our view the most important. As the IMF states67: “In some countries where e-money is 
taking off, users trust telecommunications and social media companies more than banks.” 
Worse, in some of the same countries there is no trust in local fiat money as a store of value.  
For example, following hyperinflation in Zimbabwe, the State currency was demonetised 
between 2009 and 2019, and the US dollar and South African rand became effectively legal 
tender.  
 
The person or persons who used the name Satoshi Nakamoto sought to solve what he 
regarded as the trust problem inherent in conventional currencies by using innovative 
                                               
66 The IMF explains very well what this means: “If merchants and peers also use e-money, its value to 
prospective users is all the greater. And as new users join, the value to all participants—existing and 
prospective—grows. The power of network effects to spread the adoption of new services should not be 
underestimated.  Payments are not just the act of extinguishing a debt. They are an exchange, an interaction 
between people—a fundamentally social experience. If two people use the same payment method, a third is 





cryptography in the creation of bitcoin.68 However, money must also possess other properties, 
including being a credible measure of value/recording system. Thus, in countries where the 
polity neither trusts the institutions of the government nor the local currency, barring the 
possibility of using foreign fiat money as legal means of payment either through a currency 
board or by “legalising” the black market, local consumers might feel that they have more 
trust in means of payment such as Libra or possible future bank stable-coins.   
 
With Libra-type payment mechanisms, fiat currency is displaced by a basket of currencies, 
with downside risks, but also with the potential to iron out exchange risk and minimise the 
risk of hyperinflation. The consequence is that this type of instrument automatically becomes 
a credible measure of value. It is this property of planned payment systems like Libra that 
could make them attractive, not merely that they might be a better store of value than local 
fiat.  Some “safe assets”, including fine metal items circulating in the black market, can be a 
safe store of value, but they can also be subject to various frictions which makes them less 
usable than synthetic “currencies” like Libra or stable-coins.  
 
At the same time, even if the use of Libra or of a foreign digital currency was allowed to 
stabilise an unstable economy, this development would not be cost-free for the “importing” 
national economy. In such a case, the impact on developing market economies will be even 
more accentuated in terms of importing the economic and monetary cycle of the countries 
issuing the dominant currency.  
 
 
4. A Survey of the Legal Infrastructure  
4.1  Law Matters 
One of the key arguments of this article is that instruments that are not perceived to enjoy the 
protection of private and/or public law will not be able to survive as durable means of exchange 
under conditions of stress. The matter is, therefore, not merely theoretical/philosophical, but is 
also one of practical importance for the use of the new instruments beyond retail payments, 
especially in commerce and investment, which make up the bulk of the modern economy.  
 
Most of these instruments may enjoy user confidence in the beginning or during good times 
due to custom created by social preferences, e.g., social preferences to transact and pay for 
essentials using forms of money/means of payment that are not issued by governments. But 
                                               
68 Satoshi Nakamoto, "Bitcoin P2P e-cash paper" (31 October 2008), online: Satoshi Nakamoto Institute, 
<https://satoshi.nakamotoinstitute.org/emails/cryptography/1/>; Nakamoto, "Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer 
Electronic Cash System" (24 May 2009), online: Bitcoin < https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf>. 
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when a generic economic event, i.e., one that is not related to specific cryptoassets or other 
payment-like instruments, creates a crisis of confidence in the market, it is predictable that only 
assets that are perceived to enjoy legal recognition of their status a means of payment will be 
seen as a safe means of payment. Naturally, a widespread economic, political instability or a 
natural catastrophe many also undermine the position of fiat as a reliable measure of value. But 
as fiat is recognised as money by statute what happens in that case is outside the scope of this 
paper.  
 
Money-like instruments created with the aid of new technology have, in some cases, blurred 
the boundaries between money and investment. The latter have been so far two distinct legal 
and, to some extent, economic concepts. Investment instruments such as securities have 
traditionally been subjected, since at least the introduction of US New Deal statutes,69 to 
serious barriers to entry, due to a high disclosure burden and other investor protection controls. 
However, these are barriers/frictions that neither public nor privately created fiat money have 
ever experienced.  
 
To offer some answers on the matter of the perceived legality of the new instruments, we 
explore in the following paragraphs the meaning of money both in statute and even more 
importantly in common law. 
 
4.2 Lex Monetae and Lex Contractus  
The well-known-passage from Knapp’s book that “[m]oney is a creature of law,” and hence 
“[t]he soul of currency is not in the material of the pieces” – i.e. not connected to metals via 
some intrinsic value – “but in the legal ordinances which regulate their use”70 mainly meant 
that money is only state money. Today, this could be paraphrased to mean that only those 
means of payment that can be recognised as such by law can be considered as money. This 
formulation would acknowledge that there is no reason to exclude from the legal definition 
and understanding of money means of payment that are not fiat, provided that their role as 
means of payment is not restricted by law. To some extent, this would be a modification of 
                                               
69 The U.S. Supreme Court’s Howey case and subsequent case law have found that an “investment 
contract” exists when there is: (a) the investment of money, (b) in a common enterprise, (c) that is 
premised on a reasonable expectation of profits, (d) which are to be derived from the efforts of others. See 
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).  See also United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 
837 (1975); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967); SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 
(1943). 
 
70 Knapp, supra note 4 at p 1.  
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the lex monetae,71 yet it would fit well with common law’s flexible approach as to what is 
understood as “money”.  
 
We suggest that there is no reason why a broader definition/legal understanding of “money” 
be seen as a challenge to the competence of the state to exercise the three exclusive rights 
underpinning the lex monetae: — the right to issue currency, that is, coins and banknotes that 
are legal tender72 within its territory; the right to determine and change the value of that 
currency; and the right to regulate the use of that currency, or any other currency, within its 
territory.73 The adoption of the euro as the single currency of 19 member States of the 
European Union has shown that monetary sovereignty can be pooled74.  It has also shown 
that money can exist as a single “book currency” alongside banknotes in different national 
currencies, as happened between 1999 and 2001 when the European Central Bank issued the 
first euro notes. 
 
There is an important distinction between the lex monetae and the lex contractus, i.e. between 
the sovereign right of a state in respect of its currency, on one hand, and the contractual 
relationship between private parties governed by private law on the other. It is the lex 
contractus that governs questions, for example, as to the time of payment for the purposes of 
contractual provisions as to payment75. Thus, the choice of currency or similar means of 
payment should be deemed to be within the rights of the parties to the contract. Its legal effect 
does not depend on the law governing the contract being the law of the country whose currency 
is the chosen means of payment76. Namely, while the public law of a country can be exclusive 
                                               
71 Lex monetae is the body of law which concerns particular aspects of money, and particularly currency 
and legal tender.  Its role is reflected in the international law doctrine of monetary sovereignty.   
 
72 Legal tender or legal money means money recognised as such by the law of land. It is the money issued 
by a monetary authority or government which (subject to the parties’ agreement) cannot be refused by any 
person in payment for transactions. The tender or payment in this money constitutes by law the sufficient 
discharge of debt. 
 
73 François Gianviti, “Current Legal Aspects of Monetary Sovereignty”, in International Monetary Fund,  
Current Developments in Monetary and Financial Law (IMF, 2005), ch 1 at p 4; Luc Thevenoz, “The 
Single Currency and Other Countries: the Swiss Point of View” (1997) 3 I.B.L.J. 1997 275-317. 
 
74 Rosa Lastra, International Financial and Monetary Law 2nd ed (Oxford University Press, 2015) at para 
1.59. 
 
75 Mardorf Peach & Co Ltd v Attica Sea Carriers Corporation of Liberia [1977] AC 850; Spar Shipping 
AS v Grand China Logistics (Group) Co Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 982. 
 
76 Norbert Horn, ed., German Banking Law and Practice in International Perspective (Berlin: De Gruyter, 
1999) at p 33. 
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as to what is the legal tender in a specific country, that should not affect the choice of other 
means of payment by the contractual parties.  
  
The right to choose the means of payment in a contract is also consistent with the approach 
adopted by English courts that have consistently avoided offering an exclusive definition of 
money. Still, in most cases the English courts have assumed that “money” is something 
which is issued by, or with the authority of, a State,77 and to that extent have tended to adopt 
the State theory of money.78 
 
The courts also accept the face value of the right expressed in money.  In Banco de Portugal 
v Waterlow & Sons Ltd79 the Portuguese central bank commissioned printers to produce 
Vasco da Gama 500-escudo notes. The printers were also fraudulently induced to deliver 
notes printed from the original plates and so not distinguishable from the original set.  
Consequently, the bank had to withdraw from circulation the entire issue and replace both the 
genuine and fraudulent notes. The court held that the bank could claim damages based on the 
face value of the notes and not just the cost of physically producing them. 
 
4.3 Money under Statutory Law 
 
The terms “money” and “currency” may be used interchangeably in legal sources, currency 
referring to the currency of a specific State.  The term “legal tender”, though sometimes used 
as a synonym for money or currency, is a distinct concept referring to what (contractual 
agreement aside) a debtor is entitled to proffer in repayment of a debt – tender of the State’s 
currency operates in effect as a defence to an action in debt. The terms may be found in the 
same statute. For example, in s.13 of Singapore’s Currency Act80, the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore has “… the sole right to issue currency notes and coins in Singapore and only such 
notes and coins issued by the Authority shall be legal tender in Singapore81”. Similarly, in s.3 
of the Reserve Bank of India Act 193482, the RBI has responsibility to manage the currency, 
                                               
 
77 Adelaide Electric Supply C. Ltd v Prudential Assurance Co Ltd [1934] AC 122, Bonython v 
Commonwealth of Australia [1951] A.C. 201. 
 
78 Mann, The Legal Aspect of Money 5th ed (UK: Oxford University Press, 1992) at p 15. 
 
79 [1932] All ER Rep 181; [1932] AC 452. 
80 (Cap 69, 2002 Rev Ed Sing). 
 
81 Up to a limit of 20 coins per denomination for each transaction to minimise inconvenience to vendors 
and their waiting customers should a customer wish to tender a large quantity of coins for payment. 
 
82 No. 2 of 1934. 
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s.22 states that “the sole right to issue bank notes in India”, and s.26 states that “every bank 
note shall be legal tender at any place in India in payment, or on account for the amount 
expressed therein”. However, the development of modern payment systems has meant that 
the concept of legal tender has been of diminishing importance for quite some time.83 
 
The state theory of money is endorsed by the Uniform Commercial Code (the “UCC”) of the 
United States (which was mainly drafted in the 1940s and 1950s and is by enactment part of 
US State law).  In its general definitions, the UCC states that “Money” means a medium of 
exchange “currently authorized or adopted by a domestic or foreign government”84. The key 
test is that “sanction of government, whether by authorization before issue or adoption 
afterward, which recognizes the circulating medium as a part of the official currency of that 
government” is required. But the UCC does not reflect the narrow view that money is limited 
to legal tender, although the existence of legal tender presupposes a state monetary system. 
The definition continues stating that, “[t]he term includes a monetary unit of account 
established by an intergovernmental organization or by agreement between two or more 
countries”.  This is broad enough to extend to the euro, but not to Libra. It could seemingly 
extend to the IMF’s Special Drawing Right (“SDR”), but the IMF itself does not favour such 
an approach, saying that the “SDR is neither a currency nor a claim on the IMF. Rather, it is a 
potential claim on the freely usable currencies of IMF members. SDRs can be exchanged for 
these currencies”85. 
 
According to Article L.111-1 of the French Monetary and Financial Code86, “The currency of 
France is the euro”. This is therefore the only currency with legal tender status in France. 
Thus, crypto-assets cannot be qualified as legal tender in France. Consequently, they can be 
refused as payment without violating the provisions of Article R.642-3 of the French Penal 
Code87, under which it is an offence to refuse payment in banknotes and coins denominated 
in euro with legal tender status.  
 
                                               
 
83 The US jurist Herman Oliphant had noted in 1920: “The narrower definition of money is inconvenient in 
practice. . . [T]he greater part of our circulating medium is not legal tender.” See Oliphant, “The Theory of 
Money in the Law of Commercial Instruments” (1920) 29 Yale Law Journal 606 at p 617. 
 
84 U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(24). 
 
85 “Factsheet: Special Drawing Rights”, International Monetary Fund (8 March 2019), online: 
<https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/14/51/Special-Drawing-Right-SDR>. 
 
86 Code Monétaire et Financier (French Monetary and Financial Code) art 111-1 CMF. 
 
87 Code penal (French Penal Code) art 642-3 C pén. 
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Article 1, section 10 of the US Constitution prohibits States from making anything other than 
gold or silver coins legal tender, but it does not prohibit the Federal government from doing 
so. This was the seminal ruling of the US Supreme Court in 1871,88 upholding (by a five-to-
four majority) the constitutionality of the Legal Tender Act 1862, enacted to enable the 
Federal government to issue paper money (greenbacks) to fund the civil war without raising 
additional taxes. 
 
Crypto-assets are not “electronic money” under EU law, in that they are not issued on receipt 
of funds.89 Therefore, and unlike electronic money, crypto-assets do not benefit from an EU 
guarantee to be reimbursed at face value in the event of an unauthorised payment. This does 
not necessarily mean that EU law is grounded in a narrow approach. The Fifth EU Anti-
Money Laundering Directive (“5MLD”)90 has a legal definition of cryptocurrency, or virtual 
currency as it is called: 
““virtual currencies” means a digital representation of value that is not 
issued or guaranteed by a central bank or a public authority, is not 
necessarily attached to a legally established currency and does not possess a 
legal status of currency or money, but is accepted by natural or legal persons 
as a means of exchange and which can be transferred, stored and traded 
electronically”.91 
 
This somewhat opaque definition is clearly intended to distinguish a “virtual currency” 
from the currency issued by a State, and therefore by inference, a virtual currency does 
not possess the legal status of money.  
 
The 5MLD definition appears to leave open the possibility that a “stable coin” which 
is “necessarily attached” to a “legally established currency” should be treated as 
“money”.  In fact, the Court of Justice of the European Union has ruled that the 
services of a bitcoin exchange in exchanging bitcoin for a traditional currency is 
                                               
88 Knox v. Lee, Parker v Davis, 79 U.S. 457 (1871). 
 
89 See EC, Directive 2009/110/EC of 16 September 2009 on the taking up, pursuit and prudential 
supervision of the business of electronic money institutions amending Directives 2005/60/EC and 
2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 2000/46/EC, [2009] OJ, L 167/7 (“Directive 2009/110/EC”), Art. 
2(2).  
 
90 EC, Directive (EU) 2018/843 of 30 May 2018 amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of 
the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing and amending 
Directives 2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU, [2018] OJ, L 156/43. (“Directive (EU) 2018/843"). 
 
91 Directive (EU) 2018/843 amended Directive (EU) 2015/849 by adding a new Art 3(18). Again, virtual 
currencies should not to be confused with electronic money as defined in point (2) of Article 2 of Directive 
2009/110/EC. 
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exempt from VAT on the basis of the “currency” exemption (Skatteverket v David 
Hedqvist, Case C-264/1492), but this decision should be taken as limited to the 
particular context.  
 
4.4 Money at Common Law 
4.4.1 Money at Common Law: a commercial rather than doctrinal approach  
 
The common law has tended to avoid overarching definitions of money93.  Classically, and in 
keeping with its character as a system developed by judges over time, the common law has 
considered legal questions as to the nature of money in the context in which they arise94—and 
such questions arise particularly in relation to payment95.   
 
In a plethora of cases, English courts have been careful not to define money in a 
determinative or restrictive way, taking a broadly pragmatic commercial approach that may 
be seen as consistent with “societal/relational” theory of money. The leading case of Miller v 
Race (1758) 1 Burrow 452 was decided at a time when banknotes were becoming common 
for higher value payments. In its way, this was as fundamental a change as e-money is now, 
since the past link (albeit sometimes tenuous) between money and the intrinsic value of 
coinage was completely absent. 
 
Citing the needs of commerce, Lord Mansfield treated banknotes as negotiable, so that 
property passed to someone taking them in good faith.  However, he placed them in a distinct 
category of property, saying that “…they are not goods, not securities, nor documents for 
debts, nor are so esteemed: but are treated as money, as cash, in the ordinary course and 
transaction of business, by the general consent of mankind; which gives them the credit and 
currency of money, to all intents and purposes”. The ratio of the decision is that, “A bank-
note is constantly and universally, both at home and abroad, treated as money, as cash; and 
                                               
 
92 See Georgios Dimitropoulos, “Global Currencies and Domestic Regulation - Embedding through 
Enabling?”, in Philipp Hacker et al., eds, Regulating Blockchain, Techno-social and Legal Challenges 
(Oxford University Press, 2019), ch 6. 
 
93 There is no presumption in favour of any one meaning of the word “money”: Perrin v Morgan [1943] 
A.C. 399 (in the context of a will).  
 
94 Ewan McKendrick, Goode on Commercial Law 5th ed (UK: Penguin, 2016) at para 17.05. 
 
95 See generally Victoria Dixon, ed, Goode on Payment Obligations in Commercial and Financial 
Transactions 4th ed (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2020, forthcoming). 
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paid and received, as cash; and it is necessary, for the purposes of commerce, that their 
currency should be established and secured”. 
 
This robustly commercial approach is not unique to money.  It was also adopted by the courts 
to determine the negotiability of financial instruments generally. The leading case is Goodwin 
v Robarts (1874-75) L.R. 10 Ex. 33796 in which the court in reaching its decision took a 
deeply international as well as commercial approach97, having recourse to the law merchant, 
lex mercatoria, commercial custom and usage, the treatment of analogous instruments in 12th 
and 13th century Florence and Venice and textbooks from the United States, Germany and 
France. This case is also notable for an early judicial recognition of what we now call 
(privately created) bank money at a time when the cheque was a novelty98. 
 
The courts likewise have had no difficulty in distinguishing between money and 
commodities. In Moss v Hancock99, the court ordered the return to the person, from whom it 
had been stolen, a five-pound gold piece – the coin, though legal tender, had a value greatly 
in excess of its face value. In effect the court treated the coin not as fungible money but as a 
commodity, on the grounds that this reflected the commercial transaction by which the 
defendant came to possess it100. Adopting the view of an economist of the day, the court 
defined money as “that which passes freely from hand to hand throughout the community in 
final discharge of debts and full payment for commodities …”101. Therefore, on the basis of 
this decision, it could be argued that any one of the new instruments, whether a 
cryptocurrency or a stable-coin that is regularly used for the discharge of debt obligations and 
is accepted for the purchase of goods and services, could qualify as “money” in common law.  
 
As Joanna Perkins has suggested: “In principle, virtual currencies which have achieved status 
as a medium of exchange within a significant user community have a good claim to be 
                                               
 
96 Affirmed in Goodwin v Roberts (1876) 1 App. Cas. 476 (HL). 
 
97 William Blair, “Negotiability and Estoppel” (1988) 1 JIBL (Journal of International Banking Law) at p 
8. 
 
98 L.R. 10 Ex. 337, p 351. 
 
99 [1899] 2 QB 111 QBD. 
100 A similar view was adopted in the US authority of Cordner v. United States, US Court of Appeals, 671 
F.2d 367 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 
101 [1899] 2 QB 111, QBD, p 116. 
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regarded as money”.102  This is an important test and sits squarely within the constituent 
analysis presented in this article. Only virtual means of payment that have a large user 
community and have continuous use as means of payment/measure of value, even in times of 
stress, would be regarded as money. The fact that such means of payment are not legal tender 
is not however in any way a restrictive element. 
 
The courts’ pragmatism can also be found in the famous Foley v Hill103 case which decided 
that that "the relation between banker and customer, as far as the pecuniary dealings are 
concerned, [is] that of debtor and creditor" with the money belonging to the bank, and not to 
the customer.  This “historical breakthrough”104 cleared the way for the legally acknowledged 
development of (privately created) bank money. As expressed by the US Supreme Court in 
2016, “When a customer deposits funds,  the  bank  ordinarily  becomes the owner of the 
funds and consequently has the right  to  use  the  funds  as  a  source  of  loans  that  help  the  
bank  earn  profits  (though  the  customer  retains  the  right, for  example,  to  withdraw  
funds)”105.  
 
Overall the case law shows that definitions are not static. As has been pointed out by 
Gleeson,106 it does not follow that the question of whether a particular instrument is money or 
not should be a once-and-for-all determination. As he says: “[i]t seems clear that the question 
of what the law regards as money can only be answered by looking at what society itself regards 
as money”107  
  
In any case, the “enormous growth potential” for digital currencies “builds on the 
vision they provide for the disintermediation of payments between distant parties so 
as to result in increased speed, a decrease in costs, expansion of user bases, as well as 
enhanced security”.108 On the other hand, it is the authors’ view that bitcoin operates 
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more like a commodity, rather than money, and is both too unstable and 
insufficiently frictionless to be used generally as a medium of exchange.   
 
4.4.2 Money as Property 
The view that money may also be a form of property is nothing new.109  As Judge Richard 
Posner110 held in the case of In re Oakley 344 F.3d 709 (7th Cir. 2003), money is classified as 
a species of intangible personal property. The question arose in the context of different 
exemptions for tangible and intangible property under bankruptcy law, which is why the 
classification made a difference111. 
 
As regards cryptocurrencies, an early legal decision is that of the Tokyo District Court in 
2015, arising out of the collapse of the Tokyo based Mt Gox exchange, which again arose in 
a bankruptcy. The court held that bitcoin lacked the necessary “corporeality” to be considered 
as property under the Civil Code112. More recently, B2C2 Ltd v Quoine Pte Ltd [2019] 
SGHC(I) 03 is a decision of the Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC), applying 
contractual principles and trust law to a cryptocurrency trading case. The judge ruled that 
virtual currencies can be considered as property which are capable of being held on trust and 
analysed the doctrine of mistake in the context of contracts that are automatically entered into 
through algorithmic programming. 
 
The judiciary has also contributed to the debate by means other than just case law. In November 
2019, the UK Jurisdiction Taskforce113 (which is part of the UK LawTech Delivery Panel) 
published a Legal statement on Cryptoassets and Smart Contracts which reviewed the 
applicable English law principles and concluded that cryptoassets are to be treated in principle 
as property.  This does not however equate so-called exchange tokens with money or money-
like means of payment.   
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Applying this analysis, the London Commercial Court recently held that crypto currencies are 
a form of property capable of being the subject of a proprietary injunction.  By granting 
injunctions against both the unknown persons who had extracted a ransom in bitcoin and the 
crypto exchange to which the bitcoin had been tracked, the court sought to maximise the 
possibilities of recovery and preventing the coin being exchanged into fiat.114 
 
Even more important for the purposes of our analysis is a much older case decided by the late 
Elizabethan courts. In Gilbert v. Brett (‘Case of Mixt Monies’),115 the court decided that 
money is tendered and received at nominal rates in discharge of debts without regard to any 
debasement that may have occurred to the physical coinage. The case confirmed the principle 
of monetary nominalism in the common law, which is taken as ruling out revalorisation on 
grounds of inflation (absent special terms such as gold clauses116).  This has been described 
as a fundamental principle of modern monetary law in all Western jurisdictions117. 
 
As David Fox has commented,118 the case provided the foundation for the common law’s use 
of nominal values to enforce monetary obligations, and so has remained important long after 
the demise of commodity money systems at issue in the case itself. Nominalism also offers 
support to the argument that only instruments that can serve as a reliable measure of value 
would prove to be sustainable as means of payment/exchange. It is hard to see how parties 
will accept to use in their contracts as a new method of payment an instrument that runs the 
risk of serious devaluation in full knowledge that the common law courts will not accept any 
revaluation. 
 
4.4.3 Money and payment 
 
Although money and payment are distinct concepts, they are linked, and in respect of 
payment in particular, there is a large body of law. The case law has tracked the development 
of money as it exists in commercial dealings – from metallic coins, to paper money, to bank 
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money (deposits and transfers), to electronic money119, and recently as noted above, to 
cryptocurrency.  In law, payment usually denotes the transfer of money or a money fund, or 
performance of some other act tendered and accepted in discharge of a money obligation.120 
 
The common law has developed a series of rules which have adapted as the monetary system 
develops through different forms. An example is the case of Miliangos v George Frank Ltd 
[1976] AC 443 where the court ruled that creditors under a contract are entitled to obtain 
judgment in a foreign currency where that is the money of account. In Camdex International 
Ltd v Bank of Zambia [1997] EWCA Civ 798 it was made clear that any sum of money, 
whatever currency it is denominated in “retains its character as a medium of exchange”121. In 
procedural terms, up to enforcement, the foreign currency provides the link to measurement 
of interest rates rather than the domestic currency. 
   
During the 19th century, the rise of commercial banks (and bodies offering similar services 
such as building societies, savings and loans, and credit unions) with reliable and accessible 
statements of account, and the development of reliable payment systems (such as cheque 
clearing) tended to blur the legal concept of money/currency/legal tender with rules as to 
payment. This remains true now with the availability of multiple methods of payment. The 
development of cryptocurrency, on the other hand, as has been explained, is not principally 
about payment.   
 
Mobile payment applications, on the other hand, although hardly more than a decade old, have 
become ubiquitous at the consumer level. Once fiat money gets out of the bank account into a 
user’s Alipay/WeChat Pay electronic purse, the system largely operates autonomously.122  As 
far as users are concerned, the physical link with the fiat currency has disappeared – it is 
however the denomination in the fiat currency, and the financial infrastructure that comes with 
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that,123 that enables the systems to function. For users, “money” may seem like an increasingly 
remote concept, but nevertheless, it is the way money is articulated by the law, which underlies 
the whole process, that will matter the most in times of uncertainty.  
 
Even if some of these instruments are not subject to the laws of default, in that they may or 
may not incorporate a promise of conversion to fiat, the value of most of these instruments is 
inextricably linked to the laws of supply and demand. Any fall in demand in time of stress 
affects their popularity and thus market price, which is in essence the only indication of their 
value. Therefore, in addition to other structural weaknesses, it is likely that a number of these 




Electronic technologies developed in the context of the 4th Industrial Revolution can make it 
cheaper to access and easier to handle and exchange money. Arguably, the main paradigm shift 
the new technology brings about will be in the field of international payments, which could 
thus become safer, cheaper and more accessible. Overall renewed competition in the field of 
retail payments which can, for instance, greatly increase the value of remittances to consumers 
should be welcome. But would the new means of payment that the technological revolution 
bring with it, whether cryptocurrencies, stable-coins or other instruments, qualify as “money”? 
 
Based on the preceding legal and economic analysis, this article has argued that a pluralistic 
approach to “money” that would extend its scope beyond fiat could be less problematic than is 
often predicted, provided that two conditions are fulfilled. First, the token itself or the right it 
incorporates must be recognised by law - and the position taken by common law is quite 
flexible on this point. Second, the token must be able to retain its function as a measure of 
value at all times; if the token cannot perform this function at all times, user trust will be greatly 
undermined.  
 
New means of payment should retain both properties, independent of any other utilities that 
cryptoassets possess, in closing the funding gap for start-ups or small issuers, or the socio-
economic benefits that some instruments may eventually build, as is the case with so-called 
utility tokens. There is an ever-increasing overlap between the new means of payment and 
other classes of cryptoassets when it comes to reduction of transaction costs and of other 
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frictions. But even with advancements in today’s computing technology, it is hard to imagine 
investment-like instruments or utility tokens serving as a widely used and objective measure 
of value.  
 
There are several reasons to justify regulators’ desire to regulate the new instruments, including 
money laundering, heightened consumer protection concerns (fraud), and even financial 
stability issues if one of these new instruments, e.g., Libra, builds scale. Nonetheless, the 
rationale to regulate/legislate should not include the assumption that the state is a monopoly 
supplier of credible money. Similarly, instruments whose value would collapse in times of 
stress would not be able to qualify as private or market-based money under any broad definition 
of money.  
 
This should be seen in the context of payment. The inability to act as a safe measure of value 
seriously impacts on the function of any instrument to act as a means of exchange.  Means of 
payment cannot only be credible in good times, namely as “fair weather” money. Therefore, 
any new instrument, which is not a digital representation of fiat, may not realistically be called 
“money” if it cannot be used as credible measure of value at all times.  
 
The dual test this article presents for the classification of new instruments as “money” does not 
constitute a return to the metallic rule. It is broad enough to include new means of payment 
that contain rights recognised by law and which over a period of time are used in the economic 
and social process as a trusted measure of value. At the same time, the test is narrow enough 
to exclude instruments whose primary purpose is to act as investments rather than a means of 
payment used to measure value. This formulation inevitably excludes from our understanding 
of “money” in the 4th Industrial Revolution highly volatile instruments which users will not 
trust in times of stress. 
